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1:14) So far we’ve considered two metaphysical positions regarding the freeness- or not- of our actions: hard determinism and libertarian free will. If you’ve found both of them to be wanting, well compatibilism might just be for you.
(1:26) Compatibilists believe, somewhat like hard determinists, that the universe operates with law-like order, and that the past determines the future. But, they also think there’s something different about some human actions; that some of the actions we take really are free. This view, known as soft determinism, says that everything is actually determined, but we can still call an action free when the determination comes from within ourselves.
(1:50) It’s like the difference between someone being pushed off a diving board, as opposed to jumping. The result is the same- you end up in the water- but it does look like the cause is different. In case 1, the cause is the pusher, while in case 2, the cause is the jumper.
(2:01) Compatibilists say that in both cases, the action is determined- that is, it couldn’t not happen- but when the action of an agent is self-determined or determined by causes internal to themself- the action should be considered free.
(2:15) This means that we have moral responsibility for our actions, since the determination for some of our acts can come from us alone. And this was something, you’ll recall, that hard determinists seemed to have to give up.
(2:27) But, it’s unclear how meaningful moral responsibility really is, in this view. After all, if we’re still determined, just by our own internal factors, then in what sense are we actually responsible?
Which brings us back to the man with the brain tumor.
(2:39) If a growth in your brain, which you have no control over, causes you to have impulses that you also have no control over - do you act freely if you act on those urges?
(2:51) Pedophilia-induced brain tumors are, luckily, rare, but there are much more common cases that are similar. For example, should we hold people who suffer from severe mental illnesses responsible for their actions? After all the causes of their actions are internal to themselves, so a compatibilist might be inclined to say that they’re free. Yet it seems wrong to blame someone who’s in the grip of, say, hallucinations in the same way that we’d blame someone who’s not.
(3:13) What about someone who becomes flirty after a few drinks? Do we assign that behavior to the drinker, or to the drinks?
The drinker’s actions are caused by factors internal to themself- the alcohol, sure, but also their body chemistry. how much they ate before drinking, and who knows how many other factors.